“If I had foreseen Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I would have torn up my formula in 1905.” –Albert Einstein.

Next month, “Fallout 4,” a highly-anticipated video game releases. Dealing with various Americans a couple centuries after nuclear war, the Fallout series is known for its strong writing, dark humor, and bleak outlook. “War never changes,” Ron Pearlman bitterly narrates over each game’s introduction. The player character is never able to save the world or return it to what it was. Only slow progress is possible, and only if the player character chooses benevolent options. One entry’s entire quest involves bringing clean water to the inhabitants of DC. Not only does the most recent entry release soon, but we also approach the date in the Fallout universe on which nuclear war broke out: October 23, 2077, the games explain, sees a nuclear exchange between the United States and China that ends life as we know it in a mere two hours.

Some real-life anniversaries accompany this: 2015 is the 70th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the founding of the United Nations, intended to prevent another war capable of destroying the planet. The reason I bring this up (besides my love of video games) is that despite popular perceptions, nuclear disarmament is still a prevalent issue in today’s world. Here are some possibilities for the use or exchange of nuclear weapons:

• First, there is the ever-present fear, not unjustified, that a terrorist group could gain control of a nuclear weapon. As Fareed Zakaria points out in The Future of Freedom, nuclear weapons existed 70 years ago, the era of black-and-white televisions, rotary phones, and no commercial air traffic: The science of creating a nuclear weapon is not so complicated by today’s standards.

• Religious nationalists in India have recently taken power. Under Modi, Pakistan is unstable and beset by its own religious extremists, and both still claim Kashmir.

• North Korea is always as volatile as its current autocrat. It has a tiny stockpile of nukes, but their unpredictability worries world leaders across the globe.

• President Obama, along with other heads of state, is to be congratulated for negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. However, hardline elements in Iran are still pro-expansion, which is worrying. There is also the outside possibility of an exchange with the State of Israel.

• The United States and Russia are currently at odds over the conflict in Ukraine.

Thankfully, none of these conflicts is particularly likely to escalate into nuclear war, but they are worth considering and keeping an eye on.

I should also point out our own extremists: Senator Jon Kyl nearly undermined the New START treaty with Russia in 2010/2011. His cooperation was secured only with massive pork-barrel projects for his state and a promise of tens of billions of dollars in nuclear modernization. John Bolton, meanwhile, took what appeared to be a pro-nuke stance in a New York Times piece. All this despite the fact that the United States has the most nuclear weapons on high alert in the world (closely followed by Russia, which has more nukes but fewer on high alert).

The threat of nuclear exchange did not end with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It may not be the most pressing problem in the world, but peace activists should continue to work towards a world free of the threat of nuclear destruction.

Check out Isao Hashimoto’s visual representation of every nuclear explosion from 1945 to 1998.

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Republicans are complaining that Obama should have met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the subject of Iran’s nuclear capability. However, Netanyahu wants the U.S. to announce its “red line” for going to war with Iran. As David Ignatius points out in a recent Washington Post column,

 “Obama believes he has drawn the U.S. red line as clearly as a superpower ever should, given that some ambiguity is useful in deterring an adversary. For the record, Obama said in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic in March that it was ‘a profound national security interest of the United States to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.’ U.S. intelligence would provide ‘a pretty long lead time in which we will know that they are making that attempt …’

… Netanyahu should understand that no country can allow another to impose the conditions under which it will go to war. The Israeli leader wants a tripwire that would trigger military action. But presidents don’t turn over that power of war and peace, even to their best friends. Indeed, it’s precisely because Obama means what he says about going to war that he wants maximum flexibility in how and when he takes action.”

Should the U.S. give up all flexibility and cede its decision-making power to Israel? Ignatius continues,

“The United States needs to take control of the deadly confrontation with Iran, rather than being cajoled and buffeted by its smaller, weaker ally. Obama needs to own the policy of prevention he has declared.”

Read more here.

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When I was in high school in the early 1960s, I shared a fear with most of my contemporaries about the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the emphasis was on nuclear weapons, and we were scared of a catastrophic and cataclysmic war. Schools tried to allay students’ fears and convince them that if Soviet missiles were launched, everyone would be safe by using the “duck and cover” method of getting underneath their desks. That didn’t fool anyone.

It occurred to me that it might be more productive for the United States to focus less on increasing its nuclear stockpile and instead looking for a way to defend itself against incoming missiles. I wrote a letter to Missouri Senator Stuart Symington (a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee), urging him to diminish the growth of American nuclear warheads and instead to concentrate on defense against incoming missiles and bombers.

In an effort to make the case for defense, I used a baseball analogy. I said that if a batter hits a ball over the outfield fence, it is a home run. It didn’t matter whether the ball went 350 feet or 550 feet; the damage was the same; a four-bagger for the hitter. Similarly, it really wouldn’t matter whether the U.S. and the Soviet Union rained 10,000 or 50,000 nuclear warheads on one another; in either case everyone would be obliterated.

Following along with the baseball analogy, I suggested that the U.S. (as the home team) build its outfield fences as high as possible in order to keep the Soviets from penetrating our defenses and destroying us with a series of home runs. The Soviets could do the same, and if they did, we would all be safer.

What I was asking for later became known as an anti-ballistic missile system. In theory, it seemed like a good idea. Some twenty years later, during the administration of Ronald Reagan, the Pentagon actually proposed such a program and began research and development. Part of the motivation behind the program was to genuinely provide safety and security for the American people. But it didn’t take long to see that the anti-ballistic missiles were not going to work, as there was one failure after another in tests over the Pacific Ocean. But it was a program that the Soviets could not let the Americans begin without joining the fray. Many experts in both military strategy and economics saw that the burden of funding an effort to develop an anti-ballistic missile system was more for the Soviets than the Americans. In fact, it was more than the Soviets could handle. They were forced to take scarce resources from developing their domestic economy to try to develop a military program of dubious feasibility. By 1989, the Soviet economy was so top-heavy in military spending that internal unity dissolved. and the process of dividing the U.S.S.R. into seventeen separate republics irreversibly began.

Beginning in 1963, with the nuclear test ban treaty, the United States, U.S.S.R., and other nuclear powers began negotiating agreements to reduce the nuclear threat. Among the treaties were ones to reduce the nuclear arsenals of all countries.

In 2012, the Russian nuclear program is  a shadow of its former self. What worries Westerners as much as anything is a lack of security in guarding the nuclear facilities. There is persistent worry about terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons from Russia, either by blackmail or outright theft. Even if the weapons were secure, the threat of Russian destruction of any target or series of targets that it wanted would still exist. The same holds true for what the arsenal of the United States could do.

Recognizing that in all likelihood the U.S. has more weapons than it needs, the Associated Press reported on February 15, 2012 the thinking of President Barack Obama:

The Obama administration is weighing options for sharp cuts to the U.S. nuclear force, including a reduction of up to 80 percent in the number of deployed weapons, The Associated Press has learned.

Even the most modest option now under consideration would be a historic and politically bold disarmament step in a presidential election year, although the plan is in line with President Barack Obama’s 2009 pledge to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons.

No decision has been made, but the administration is considering at least three options for lower numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, cutting to: 1,000 to 1,100; 700 to 800, and 300 to 400.

As might be expected, Republicans are sharply criticizing the president. Rep. Mike Turner, R-Ohio, chairman of the Strategic Forces subcommittee chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said “These numbers represent another step by this administration blindly down the road to zero, all without a single reduction in arms from others around the world, or a thawing of the overall threat environment we live in today.”

The issue of nuclear disarmament always begins with the question of whether a country takes action unilaterally or works to negotiate a multi-lateral agreement. It appears that President Obama is willing to support unilateral action, although that would clearly be subject to change. What is important to recognize is that in an era in which primary concern about nuclear weapons is preventing rogue states or factions from acquiring them, President Obama sees the key to security as being reducing the number of weapons in the global stockpile. It’s a position that is not likely to win him many political points, but he gets considerable credit for addressing such an important issue in a courageous way.

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