There’s so much “no” in Washington, that you have to wonder if, given the opportunity to get it right, Washington [politicians and pundits included] is capable of saying yes. Although we don’t yet know precisely how it happened, Russia, Syria and the U.S. appear to have found a third way out of the chemical weapons, red-line problem: Syria’s president Bashar Al-Assad has indicated willingness to relinquish his trove of chemical weapons to international control.

However, in today’s knee-jerk, “no” political climate, will politicians on the right—who don’t want to do anything [including the basics of governing] to help President Obama—and those on the left—who insist on perfection from the president they elected—give peace a chance? Or will the right find a way to obstruct a development with so much up side, just because it’s associated with the president they revile so viscerally? Will the left, impatient with a president they thought was going to single-handedly change everything and give them everything they ever wanted, nitpick this to death, question President Obama’s motivations, give the Obama-haters even more cover, and doom the whole thing to an ignominious fizzle?

I hope not.

I also hope–in my cockeyed optimist, Obama-true-believer way–that if we do get to yes, we recognize that President Obama’s red-line stance, while politically risky, was the moral high ground–the position we should all hope that a president takes. I’ve noticed that, in most of the discussions about possible bombing scenarios, the phrase “American interests” has been thrown around a lot. Unfortunately, the “interests” most often referred to are geopolitical and financial. Rarely do you hear anything about moral interests–you know, the need to stand up against people in power who allow their own citizens to be massacred.

Also, I hope that, if Assad’s chemical weapons end up in United Nations safekeeping, President Obama gets to share some of the credit for averting a Middle East conflagration. Although I can’t believe I’m writing this, I’ve come to understand that the diplomatic solution we are all hoping for may well be the result of the sabre-rattling that has preceded it. Isn’t that how diplomacy has generally worked in the past? Alas, I’m afraid that no matter what happens, President Obama will get zero credit for a positive outcome, and all the blame for a negative one.

I acknowledge that it’s a very complicated situation, and that  actually gaining control of Assad’s weapons–in the middle of an active civil war–will be an uphill climb. Even the negotiations to get the process started are going to be very tough and very dicey.

But my bottom line is this: Sometimes, you just have to take yes for an answer. Russia seems to be saying yes. Assad seems to be saying yes. Can we?

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When I was in high school in the early 1960s, I shared a fear with most of my contemporaries about the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the emphasis was on nuclear weapons, and we were scared of a catastrophic and cataclysmic war. Schools tried to allay students’ fears and convince them that if Soviet missiles were launched, everyone would be safe by using the “duck and cover” method of getting underneath their desks. That didn’t fool anyone.

It occurred to me that it might be more productive for the United States to focus less on increasing its nuclear stockpile and instead looking for a way to defend itself against incoming missiles. I wrote a letter to Missouri Senator Stuart Symington (a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee), urging him to diminish the growth of American nuclear warheads and instead to concentrate on defense against incoming missiles and bombers.

In an effort to make the case for defense, I used a baseball analogy. I said that if a batter hits a ball over the outfield fence, it is a home run. It didn’t matter whether the ball went 350 feet or 550 feet; the damage was the same; a four-bagger for the hitter. Similarly, it really wouldn’t matter whether the U.S. and the Soviet Union rained 10,000 or 50,000 nuclear warheads on one another; in either case everyone would be obliterated.

Following along with the baseball analogy, I suggested that the U.S. (as the home team) build its outfield fences as high as possible in order to keep the Soviets from penetrating our defenses and destroying us with a series of home runs. The Soviets could do the same, and if they did, we would all be safer.

What I was asking for later became known as an anti-ballistic missile system. In theory, it seemed like a good idea. Some twenty years later, during the administration of Ronald Reagan, the Pentagon actually proposed such a program and began research and development. Part of the motivation behind the program was to genuinely provide safety and security for the American people. But it didn’t take long to see that the anti-ballistic missiles were not going to work, as there was one failure after another in tests over the Pacific Ocean. But it was a program that the Soviets could not let the Americans begin without joining the fray. Many experts in both military strategy and economics saw that the burden of funding an effort to develop an anti-ballistic missile system was more for the Soviets than the Americans. In fact, it was more than the Soviets could handle. They were forced to take scarce resources from developing their domestic economy to try to develop a military program of dubious feasibility. By 1989, the Soviet economy was so top-heavy in military spending that internal unity dissolved. and the process of dividing the U.S.S.R. into seventeen separate republics irreversibly began.

Beginning in 1963, with the nuclear test ban treaty, the United States, U.S.S.R., and other nuclear powers began negotiating agreements to reduce the nuclear threat. Among the treaties were ones to reduce the nuclear arsenals of all countries.

In 2012, the Russian nuclear program is  a shadow of its former self. What worries Westerners as much as anything is a lack of security in guarding the nuclear facilities. There is persistent worry about terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons from Russia, either by blackmail or outright theft. Even if the weapons were secure, the threat of Russian destruction of any target or series of targets that it wanted would still exist. The same holds true for what the arsenal of the United States could do.

Recognizing that in all likelihood the U.S. has more weapons than it needs, the Associated Press reported on February 15, 2012 the thinking of President Barack Obama:

The Obama administration is weighing options for sharp cuts to the U.S. nuclear force, including a reduction of up to 80 percent in the number of deployed weapons, The Associated Press has learned.

Even the most modest option now under consideration would be a historic and politically bold disarmament step in a presidential election year, although the plan is in line with President Barack Obama’s 2009 pledge to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons.

No decision has been made, but the administration is considering at least three options for lower numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, cutting to: 1,000 to 1,100; 700 to 800, and 300 to 400.

As might be expected, Republicans are sharply criticizing the president. Rep. Mike Turner, R-Ohio, chairman of the Strategic Forces subcommittee chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said “These numbers represent another step by this administration blindly down the road to zero, all without a single reduction in arms from others around the world, or a thawing of the overall threat environment we live in today.”

The issue of nuclear disarmament always begins with the question of whether a country takes action unilaterally or works to negotiate a multi-lateral agreement. It appears that President Obama is willing to support unilateral action, although that would clearly be subject to change. What is important to recognize is that in an era in which primary concern about nuclear weapons is preventing rogue states or factions from acquiring them, President Obama sees the key to security as being reducing the number of weapons in the global stockpile. It’s a position that is not likely to win him many political points, but he gets considerable credit for addressing such an important issue in a courageous way.

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Conservatives are very concerned about strengthening America’s military while reducing the debt. They are also concerned about threats of terror, sometimes when no threat exists (e.g. Iraq).

I became somewhat alarmed when it was reported that Libya has massive amount of weapons of mass destruction. This includes ten tons of mustard gas and sarin contained in thousands of canisters. Additionally it is reported that Libya has one thousand metric tons of uranium yellowcake, a stockpile of Scud B missiles and perhaps as many as a thousand shoulder-launched missiles capable of bringing down a commercial airplane.

Like Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi has been no friend of Al Qaeda. An ironic difference is that Saddam did not possess Weapons of Mass Destruction in the early 2000s; Qaddafi has considerable amounts a decade later. What happens in post-Qaddafi Libya is a mosaic of uncertainties. The best that most of us can do in determining who the rebels are is to speculate. Are they a revolutionary group hungering for a secular democracy or are they religious fanatics including members of al Qaeda?

Whoever comes to govern Libya post-Qaddafi will have three choices with the WMDs. They can do nothing, just let them sit. They can choose to use them, although it’s unclear against whom. Finally, they could sell them. Naturally they would want the best price, so a somewhat surreptitious auction would take place.

Who would be the bidders in an auction? From the point of view of the United States, the first question would be whether or not it wants to have a seat at the table and bid. The second question is whether the United States is prepared, in the words of John F. Kennedy, to “pay any price, bear any burden, and meet any hardship” to guarantee that it wins the bidding and takes possession of the WMDs.

For good reason, the United States has not always trusted other countries. Similarly, with good reasons other countries have not always trusted the United States. Whoever has possession of weapons of mass destruction possesses the double bonus of increasing its own arsenal while depriving potential foes of increasing theirs.

Never having been in the market for weapons of mass destruction, I’m not certain what the going price is on the black market. But with what Libya has, let’s suppose that the amount is $100 billion. Remember, we’re not talking about the cost of producing them, we’re talking about how much potential new owners are willing to pay in 2011.

Money would have to be authorized for the U.S. to purchase the weapons. The Obama Administration could openly inform Congress of its desire to make the purchase. If they felt uncomfortable with that approach, they could discuss the issue secretly with leaders of Congress and its committees on intelligence.

Interestingly, it would likely be the Democrats who would have no hesitation about stepping forward and protecting America’s national defense. I presume that Republicans would want to do likewise but could they do so considering the arguments that they made in the deficit debate?

Buying Libya’s WMDs would not be consistent with Republicans Holy Grail of cutting spending. It would be the anathema; increasing spending. Would the dogma of their opposition to increased spending trump their concern for national security?

In all likelihood, the Republicans would want their cake and eat it too. They would support appropriations for America to pay whatever is necessary to keep these WMDs out of the hands of opponents. But this expenditure would require that they find other spending to cut. The precedent has already been set. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor was willing to provide federal aid to tornado-ravaged Joplin, MO if expenditures were cut for clean energy research.

Does this mean that if the U.S. bids for the WMDs that Cantor suggests taking the money from earthquake or hurricane damage to his district in Virginia? I don’t think so.

The tragedies of tornados, earthquakes, and hurricanes put us through enough pain. Do we have to further suffer from the foolishness of politicians’ responses to these tragedies? I fear asking that question to Eric Cantor, so can national leaders with an ounce of compassion come forth and ensure that America takes care of its citizens in times of need, with no strings attached? If so, let’s hear from you.

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