<\/a>All the Way<\/em>, the Tony-Award-winning play focusing on Lyndon Johnson\u2019s first year as President, demands a bravura performance by its lead actor. In the staging of this play that I have just seen at St. Louis’ Repertory Theatre, Bryan Dykstra delivers\u2014dominating the stage, just as the real LBJ took command of Congress in his effort to pass some of the most important pieces of legislation of the 20th Century.<\/p>\n The play is not a documentary, as playwright Robert Schenkkan reminds us in his introductory notes. He has taken considerable dramatic license to alter the chronology of some events and to imagine conversations that may never have occurred. But, thanks to the audiotape system in the Oval Office, the playwright did not have to invent everything. From the now-public tapes<\/a>, we know that Johnson used his Oval Office telephone as a communications weapon, calling everyone, at all hours, to wheedle, cajole, pressure, arm-twist, bully and horse-trade\u2014often using barnyard language and coarse analogies that redefined \u201cpresidential.\u201d<\/p>\n Some conversations in the play may be edited versions of the tapes, and some may be entirely fictional, but the basic facts are correct: Lyndon Johnson, self-described in the play as an accidental President, seized his moment, using the power of the Oval Office and his prodigious political skill to pass the 1965 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.<\/p>\n And in the early days of his Presidency\u2014the time period covered by All the Way<\/em>\u2014it worked. Johnson had honed his bargaining skills during 24 years in as a U.S. Congressman and Senator, and as the political prot\u00e9g\u00e9 of the powerful Senator Richard Russell<\/a> of Georgia, who is a featured presence in the play.<\/p>\n When watching political dramas, it\u2019s tempting to see the connections to current events and then to conclude that nothing ever changes. In this case, though, one of the lessons learned is that things actually have changed\u2014but not necessarily for the better.<\/p>\n As he made civil rights legislation his top priority, Johnson used everything he had to get his way. What\u2019s different here is that horse-trading worked\u2014or perhaps more fundamentally, that political horse-trading was even possible. Johnson wheeled-and-dealed both with Republicans and with members of his own Democratic party\u2014particularly those from Southern states, who opposed civil rights legislation that would alter their traditional \u201cway of life.\u201d But at least they were willing to talk and deal. We haven\u2019t seen much of that in recent years.<\/p>\n In the end, Johnson won the battle\u2014managing to get the Civil Rights and Voting Rights acts passed\u2014but he lost the war. \u201cWe just lost the South,\u201d Johnson said. And he was right: After 1965, Southern Democrats began to see themselves as alienated from the Democratic party, and eventually, their once-Democratic states went Republican. [An appropriate realignment, many would say.]<\/p>\n